FROM ASYMMETRIC AUTONOMY TO CENTRALISED GOVERNANCE: A LEGAL REVIEW OF ARTICLE 370’S ABROGATION AND ITS IMPACT ON CENTRE–STATE RELATIONS IN INDIA
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https://doi.org/10.59828/ijhce.v2i3.45##semicolon##
Article 370, asymmetric federalism, centre–state relations, constitutional governance, judicial reviewसार
This article analyzes how the Abrogation of Article 370 of India’s Constitution affects Federalism, Constitutional Governance and Centre-State Relations. This study examines the effect of Jammu and Kashmir's unique constitutional status due to Jammu and Kashmir's asymmetric autonomy, which is part of a broader strategy in India to accommodate regional diversity within a singular Constitutional framework. Serious constitutional issues arise from Asymmetric Federal Arrangements, the Role of Judicial Review, Decrees of Executive and Legislative Authority and the Transformation of Jammu and Kashmir into Union Territories after the Abrogation of Article 370 in 2019. The research will be based entirely on secondary sources following a doctrinal and systematic review strategy, which utilises only Open Access academic literature and policy studies to investigate constitutions, Presidential decrees, Parliamentary bylaws, and key court precedents. The article has three main themes: 1) the ways in which Judicial Review has produced accountability for Federal Justice; 2) The process of moving from a Constitutional System to one of Centralisation in 2019, and; 3) The nature of the Federal Architecture of India in relation to Asymmetrical Autonomy. The research finds that while the Federal structure remains intact in the Constitution, it has shifted towards greater Concentration of Power within the Central Government. Permanent restructuring will occur through the implementation of extraordinary constitutional measures (in conjunction with constrained Judicial Review), limiting Democratic Representation and Federal Authority. The Research concludes that removing Article 370 produces a constitutional result that reflects the theoretical Federalism of India, but it will produce a fundamentally different model of Federalism in practice. As a result, the developments represented in this analysis will have significant doctrinal implications for future conflicts between the centre and the states regarding Asymmetrical Autonomy, restructuring led by the Executive, and Constitutional Accountability.


